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SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON CYPRUS SITUATION:

Three new developments of major importance in the past month. The visits of Inonu and Papandreou to Washington have resulted in agreement to begin negotiations with the UN mediator and Dean Acheson in Geneva this week. General Grivas' return to Cyprus is a threat to Makarios' leadership and could lead to eventual all-out attacks by Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriots. There has been a build-up of Greek Army forces on Cyprus (7,000 troops predicted in the near future) which will lead to pressure on Inonu for intervention. A breakdown in negotiations may trigger such intervention.

State Dept. review completed

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7 July 1964

MEMORANDUM**SUBJECT: Cyprus Situation**

1. In the month that has passed since US action was successful in preventing threatened Turkish intervention on Cyprus, there have been three noteworthy developments: Prime Ministers Inonu and Papandreou have visited Washington and Paris (Inonu also consulted with British officials in London), former Greek Cypriot underground leader Grivas has returned to Cyprus, and the military build-up on the island has been drastically increased--particularly on the Greek side.

2. President Johnson's primary objective in meeting with Inonu and Papandreou was to persuade the two to designate negotiators to sit down secretly in the presence of an impartial American at a neutral spot. Inonu indicated a willingness to undertake talks with the Greeks but Papandreou strongly resisted the proposals. Papandreou was opposed on the basis that negotiations were doomed to failure since the positions of the two governments were so far apart. A breakdown in negotiations at this critical stage, he argued, could lead to hostilities.

3. Papandreou displayed little interest in any real negotiations at first, apparently feeling that time was working to Greece's advantage. (The Greeks have announced plans to take the Cyprus issue to the UN General Assembly this fall where they

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hope to secure a resolution supporting "self-determination" for Cyprus.) US officials, however, emphasized that internal pressures in Turkey may soon force the government to take another decision to intervene. Papandreou was warned not to count on the US to interpose the Sixth Fleet to prevent an actual military move. Eventually, Papandreou accepted a proposal to appoint a negotiator to meet with the UN mediator, Sakkari Tuomioja of Finland, and with a US representative appointed by the President. Inonu also agreed to appoint a similar representative to meet with UN or US representatives. Greek and Turkish negotiators will not meet-- at least at the beginning. Dean Acheson, appointed by President Johnson as the US representative, flew to Geneva on 5 July to be available for consultations when the negotiations begin this week.

4. Inonu's position, repeated in Washington, London, and Paris, was that discussions for a settlement must be based on Greek acceptance of the validity of the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959 which established the Cypriot Republic, gave the Turkish Cypriots veto rights over important government decisions, and assured Turkey of the right to intervene on Cyprus. Inonu was pessimistic in discussions with British officials over the probable outcome of the Geneva talks, contending that Turkey could never accept the ultimate aim of the Greeks--enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). He says that if the Greeks demand enosis, he will insist on "double enosis", i.e., partition, and he believes that his treaty right to intervene was reaffirmed in his talks in Washington and London.

5. Papandreou, who was disappointed at being unable to uncover what Washington would consider an acceptable final solution for Cyprus, also complained privately that US "pressure" was exerted on him both during his visit and in a letter from President Johnson on 1 July, in which negotiations for a permanent settlement were again urged. Papandreou's "solution" has remained consistent--enosis and a NATO base on Cyprus combined with international guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots.

6. The return of Grivas to Cyprus on 12 June apparently was at his own initiative, but with the encouragement of right wing groups on the island. His return was probably opposed by the Greek Government and almost certainly by Makarios, whose authority has been weakened by Grivas' presence. His popularity is such at present that even the powerful Cypriot Communist Party is now paying lip service to enosis despite its long time opposition to uniting Cyprus with NATO-member Greece. Makarios, meanwhile, is biding his time--probably waiting for the politically naive Grivas to make a blunder.

7. Grivas' public statements have coupled a demand for enosis with a call for peaceful coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots. Leaders of the Turkish community predictably have rejected Grivas' pledge of friendship, which they equate with the relationship between master and slave.

8. Leading supporters of Grivas, in contacts with US officials, have repeatedly stated that the former EOKA leader will establish firm control over the Greek Cypriot irregular bands which have not responded to Makarios' leadership. They have also stated that no unprovoked attacks will be launched by the Greek Cypriot forces against Turkish Cypriot strongpoints in the near future. Over the longer period, however, Grivas' fanatic devotion to enosis, combined with the urging of his followers for some sweeping military success, probably will lead to major attacks on Turkish Cypriot positions.

9. The rapid build-up of military forces and supplies on Cyprus probably is the most significant--and dangerous--development of the past month. According to the 1960 Treaty of Alliance among Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the Greek Army may maintain a garrison of 950 troops on the island; the Turkish Army is limited to 650.

10. Over a period of several weeks, the Turks have been smuggling arms and men into northwest Cyprus. The UN headquarters in Nicosia estimates the Turks have a capability of landing from small boats 100 to 150 men plus considerable quantities of arms and ammunition per week. Many of these arrivals may have been Turkish Cypriots returning from Turkey

While the Greeks claim the Turks now have up to 7,000 Turkish Army personnel illegally on Cyprus, our estimate would be closer to 1,000.

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25X1 11. The Greeks probably have been sending Army officers in civilian clothes to Cyprus for several months. (The two Greek Army officers killed in Famagusta in May were not members of the Greek contingent on Cyprus.)

Greek and

Greek Cypriot officials admit that personnel have been landed, alleging that they are returning Greek Cypriot students. The Turks claim most are Greek Army personnel and Premier Inonu states that up to a division of Greek troops (about 9,500 men) are illegally on the island. Our latest information, from usually reliable sources, indicates that around 4,000 Greek troops--beyond the 950 men in the contingent--are on Cyprus and that as many as 7,000 may soon be there.

12. The Greek buildup appears to be based on an assumption in Athens that Turkish intervention is inevitable. There probably is a direct connection between Greek awareness of how close the Turks came to intervening on Cyprus in early June and the decision to commit large numbers of troops to the island. Knowing that Turkey probably can maintain air and

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naval superiority near Cyprus, the Greeks apparently intend to concentrate on building up a major land force.

We believe that the Turks would be able to land the 39th Division on the island in 3 or 4 days after a decision to intervene were taken.

13. The Turks are aware of the movement of Greek troops to Cyprus, and it seems likely that pressure will mount rapidly within military circles in Ankara to take some form of drastic counter action. Failure to do so could allow Greek strength on the island to reach the point where the success of Turkish intervention would be highly problematical.

14. Attention is now focused on the negotiations about to begin in Geneva. Passions are dangerously high in both Greece and Turkey, however, and there is little optimism even at the highest levels of government in either country that negotiations will succeed. Both sides continue to look to the US for some substantive solution in addition to our procedural involvement. Should the Geneva talks collapse, Turkey may well decide that military intervention can no longer be delayed--even should the US again advise against it. Greek officials have stated repeatedly that Turkish intervention means war.

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